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1. SUMMARY
Continued studies of a radioisotope-thermionic power supply for electric
propulsion to the outer planets focused on the safety equipment to protect
against dispersal of the isotopic fuel. The safety equipment is designed
to be separated from the power supply and jettisoned early in the heliocentric
phase of the mission, as soon as Earth escape is verified. Because of this,
the mass of the safety equipment has little effect on the mass of the payload
delivered to the target planet. The objective of this study was to improve
the reliability of the safety equipment and increase safety margins at the
expense of some increase in mass.
A new reference design was prepared for the 5 kW(e) thermionic power
p)|)|
supply fueled with M+.2 kW(t) of CmpO,. The safety equipment in this
design is a passive containment system which does not rely on the operation
of any mechanisms such as a launch escape rocket or deployment of parachutes.
It includes: (l) a blast shield to protect against the explosion of the
launch vehicle; (2) a combination of refractory thermal insulation and heat
storage material to protect against a sustained launch pad fire; (3) a
reentry body with a spherical nose and a large (2.kh m diameter) conical
flare at the aft end to stabilize the reentry attitude and lower the terminal
velocity in air; (4) composite graphite thermal protection to sustain
the reentry heat pulse; (5) crushable honeycomb behind the nose to limit (to
200 Gs) the deceleration of the radioisotope source due to impact on land
at terminal velocity; (6) a double-walled secondary containment vessel
surrounding the isotopic capsules; (7) neutron shielding to reduce external
dose rates; and (8) an auxiliary cooling system employing redundant heat
pipes to remove the radioactive decay heat from the heat source and reject
it to the surroundings or to a forced convection loop. Items 1, 2, 3, and
5 were added or modified during this phase of the study to replace the
escape rockets and parachutes considered in the previous phase. The mass
of the power supplty is J2k- kg at launch, 575 kg of which is jettisoned
1.
after the Titan III-D/Centaur launch vehicle has boosted the power supply
to an escape trajectory.
The potential for achieving the 36,000-hour lifetime required for some
missions was also studied. The GnuO., capsules' (at 2030 K surface temperature)
and emitter heat pipes (at 1900 K) are expected to be the limiting components.
The effect of oxygen released from the capsules by diffusion through the
walls and through the helium vent plug was studied. It was shown that
oxygen-induced sublimation of tungsten could remove as much as 0.2 mm from
the surface of the fuel capsules in 36,000 hours, but that the loss rate would
probably be much less. It was estimated that oxygen permeating the walls
of the capsules and heat pipes could oxidize as much as 70 mS of lithium in
each heat pipe. The calculations showed that there are large uncertainties
in estimating oxygen effects from existing data, but that there is considerable
flexibility in the reference design to minimize the effects of oxygen by use
of gettering and other techniques.
This study showed the feasibility of protecting a ^ 4.2 kW (1.3 x 10
2M+Curie) source of Cm from dispersal during launch accidents. Further
work is necessary to establish the technology for long lived radioisotope
capsules and emitter heat pipes. Once the technology is established and
lifetime and performance limits are defined, it will be possible, with the
help of detailed development plans and cost estimates, to make a more well-
founded decision whether this system should be developed for some electric
propulsion missions to the outer planets or the deep space environment.
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2. INTRODUCTION
A recent study (JRef. l) examined in preliminary fashion the suitability
of an isotope-thermionic power supply for electric propulsion to the outer
planets. The main feature was a separable entry safety container which was
discarded early in the sun-centered part of the flight. The reference
design case was a 5 kW(e) system using a Curium-2^  heat source. Because
of the preliminary nature of the study, various power levels and system
configurations were examined in limited detail.
As the first phase of this study came to a close, frequent mission
analyses were carried out using the latest values for estimated power and
propulsion system masses. These calculations indicated that in spite of
the weight growth during the first phase of the study, the system was still
of interest for propulsive application. Furthermore, some of the mission
parameters, such as payload, were rather insensitive to some of the propulsion
system mass values such as the mass of the separable safety equipment. This
meant that continued work could take advantage of these insensitivities
to make the design generally more convincing from an engineering and safety
viewpoint. Also, a more detailed look at a specific design concept with
fewer alternatives could now be justified. As a result of changes in cost
and subsystem mass that evolved during the first phase of the contract,
such items as the nominal mission target and mission duration were changed
for this second phase.
In the continued study effort reported here, the goal was to consider
methods by which the separable safety equipment defined in the previous
study could be modified to improve the aerospace nuclear safety aspects of
the concept. Because these subsystems have low or negligible effect on the
mission payload, considerable mass increases could be tolerated. Also, a
more detailed examination was made of some of the lifetime and material
compatibility problems as veil as unique orbital and superorbital abort
possibilities.
As a result of these studies, the reference design reported pre-
viously (Ref . l) vas modified substantially. The principal modifica-
tion was to eliminate the launch .escape rocket and parachute systems
and replace them with thermal insulation and heat storage materials,
a blast shield, an enlarged aerodynamic flare, and a thickened crushable
honeycomb section in the nose of the reentry body. The new design is
described in Section 3- It is based on the following mission and system
constraints:
Radioisotope Cm
Power 5 kW(e)
Mission Duration 36,000 hours
Launch Vehicle Titan III D-Centaur
The full power level of 5 kW(e) is required during the first 10,000
hours and the last 10,000 hours of the mission, with low power required
during the intervening 16,000 hours. The launch vehicle will inject the
radioisotope electric propulsion system directly into a heliocentric
trajectory with a hyperbolic speed on the order of 7.5 km/sec.
3. REFERENCE DESIGN
The reference design of the radioisotope power supply is shown in
Fig. 1. The launch configuration shown here consists of three sub-
assemblies. These are the radioisotope heat source, the thermionic
converter assembly, and the safety equipment. The safety equipment is
jettisoned after the power supply is launched into a hyperbolic trajectory
relative to the earth. This leaves the flight configuration which consists
of the heat source and converter assembly. The separation of the safety
equipment, from the flight configuration is illustrated in Fig. 2, and the
flight configuration is shown in Fig. 3.
As shown in Fig. 1, the radioisotope heat source consists of the
radioisotope capsules and the capsule holder. Heat is transferred from
the capsules to the emitter heat pipes in the converter assembly by thermal
radiation. The capsule holder is covered with thermal insulation to reduce
radiant heat leakage. The thermionic converter assembly consists of:
1. The 69 emitter heat pipes (lithium in tungsten) which remove
heat from the radioisotope capsules and concentrate it in the
thermionic converters
2. The 69 thermionic converters, which convert a portion of the
isotopic heat to electrical power
3. The electrical transmission lines which transmit the electrical
power from the thermionic converters to the power conditioning
equipment
k. The 69 radiator heat pipes (potassium in niobium 1$ zirconium)
which reject the waste heat, not converted to electricity, to space
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Fig. 1. Radioisotope thermionic power supply - launch configuration
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5. The beryllium neutron shield which protects sensitive components
in the payload (2 meter dose plane diameter) and power condi-
tioning equipment from radiation damage
6. The extendable boom (not shown) which moves the radioisotope
power source away from the pay load and power conditioning after
launch
7. The power conditioning equipment (not shown) which converts the
15 V output of the thermionic power source to the levels required
by the electric thrusters.
The safety equipment includes:
1. The ho8 auxiliary cooling heat pipes (potassium in stainless steel)
which remove heat from the radioisotope capsules prior to and
during launch
2. The containment shell which provides secondary containment of
the radioisotope and protects refractory metal components from
oxidation in the earth's atmosphere
3. The helium container and circulator to remove isotopic heat
prior to launch
U. The lithium hydride neutron shield to protect persons from
neutron radiation prior to launch or following launch aborts
5 . The graphite reentry shield to protect against aerodynamic
heating following a high altitude launch abort
6. The aerodynamic flare which reduces the ballistic coefficient
of the power source and assures a stable reentry attitude
7 . The zirconia felt thermal insulation and lithium hydride heat
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absorber which protect the secondary containment shell and
auxiliary cooling heat pipes from overheating during a launch
pad fire
8. The impact energy absorber which protects the secondary contain-
ment shell and other safety equipment from damage during impact
on earth's surface.
The separation of the safety equipment from the heat source and
converter assembly is illustrated in Fig. 2. This separation is performed
after the power source has reached a hyperbolic trajectory and there is no
longer danger of reentry into the earth's atmosphere. Actuation of sepa-
ration of the safety shell from the flight configuration is by retraction
of three pins at the periphery of the aft bulkhead. When the pins are
.retracted, a separation force is supplied by three coil springs which
are stored within the flare volume. During separation, the flight system
is guided along three rails so no side force is applied at the moment
of separation. The auxiliary cooling heat pipes slide out from between the
radioisotope capsules and the emitter heat pipes as the heat source is
withdrawn from the safety equipment. When the heat source is fully removed,
a hinged, insulated door closes over the end from which the auxiliary
heat pipes have been withdrawn, and the temperatures of the heat source
/
and converter assembly rise to their normal operating conditions.
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Fig. ^. Overall dimensions of launch configuration
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k. SYSTEM MASS AND POWER SUMMARY
Figure k illustrates the overall dimensions of the launch system
and the major components of the radioisotope thermionic power supply at
the reference design power level.
A summary of the masses of the major components of the system is
given in Table 1. From this table it is seen that the total mass at
launch is 723.8 kg while the mass of the extended mission flight system
is OA8.5 kg.
A summary of the electrical power output from the system at
beginning-of-life (BOL) and end-of-life (EOL), after 36,000 hours,
is shown in Table 2.
12.
. TABLE I
SYSTEM COMPONENT MASSES
A. Extended Mission System
Curium isotope capsules 29-2 kg
Emitter heat pipes 9-0 kg
Thermionic diode components 6.k kg
Space radiator heat pipes 6.3 kg
Structure for space radiator 3.2 kg
Beryllium shield 24-1 kg
Heat source structure and insulation 15.5 kg
Transmission lines and boom 18-9 kg
Power conditioning 30.0 kg
Blast shield 5-9 kg
Flight System Total 1^ 8.5 kg
B. Disposable Safety System
Graphite and insulation on nose 11.3 kg
Graphite en cylindrical body 17.0 kg
Graphite and insulation on flare 123-7 kg
Aluminum honeycomb 25•1 kg
Zirconia/LiH fire shield 67.5 kg
Aerodynamic flare structure 35.7 kg
LiH shielding 78.6 kg
Auxiliary heat pipes 32.5 kg
Launch and impact structure 128. U kg
Jettison mechanisms (EST) 12.8 kg
Helium baffle 2.3 kg
Titanium blast shield 25.8 kg
Electronic recovery aids lU.6 kg
Safety System Total* 575-3 kg
TOTAL LAUNCH MASS 723.8 kg
*Mass of the safety system is uncertain by approximately 90 kg due to
design tolerances in the aerodynamic flare diameter and graphite thickness
(Vol. II, Section h.k-. and 6.3.3.2.).
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TABLE 2
ELECTRICAL PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS
SQL EOL
Number of operating converters 69 59
Net output (kWe) 5-93 5.0
Overall efficiency (%} - 13.^ 13.2
Total thermal power (kWt) hh.2 37-77
Voltage to P.O. (volts) 15.2 1^.9
lU.
5. AEROSPACE NUCLEAR SAFETY
5.1 SAFETY CRITERIA
The aerospace nuclear safety philosophy currently employed "by
the USAEC is complete containment of the radioisotope fuel during all
normal and accident environments. Specifically, the major safety
criteria considered in this study were:
1. Containment during a launch pad abort of a Titan IIID/Centaur
vehicle, including survival during a 10-minute 2600 K solid
propellant fire environment
2. Safety System protection during an ascent abort and resulting
explosion schrapnel
3. Fuel and Safety System protection for -worst-case atmospheric
reentry trajectories
k-. Fuel structural and thermal protection during terminal velocity
impact onto land
5. Radiation shielding to minimize exposure of operating personnel
and persons in the vicinity of an aborted system.
All of these design criteria were met using passive and redundant components,
which are listed in Table 3.
As noted in Ref. 1, these criteria were established considering that
the mission profile calls for direct insertion of the radioisotope power
supply into a heliocentric orbit with no requirement for reentry and
retrieval, except in the case of launch aborts. Although no suitable
15.
TABLE 3 .
RTFS SAFETY PACKAGE SUBSYSTEMS
1. Passive orientated reentry aeroshell with spherical nose and
aerodynamic flare
2. Pyro-Carb ablator with zirconia felt insulation, backing for re-
entry protection
3. Auxiliary heat pipe radiator
h. Auxiliary radiator solid propellant fire protection shield
5. Honeycomb
6. Launch pad helium circulation cooling chamber
7. Blast shield for fragment protection
8. Location aids for land and water impact
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guidelines exist concerning acceptable radiation exposure to persons
in the vicinity of an impact on land, it has been estimated that
recovery could be accomplished in 12 hours, which would reduce the
maximum exposure to persons within 3 meters to less than 25 rem - the
maximum whole body dose for reactor siting studies.
5.2 LAUNCH PAD EXPLOSION AND FIRE
Launch abort environments for the RTFS were modeled after those
presently employed for Space Nuclear Systems, such as the TRANSIT and
Pioneer RTGs and the Isotope Brayton Systems.
For the present study the worst-case thermal environment, in terms
of total heat input, was assumed for the heat shield design - 2600 K for
10 minutes. Concepts considered to protect the safety package in this
environment included:
1. High C heat shield materials
2. Insulation blankets
3. Thermal switch materials
U. Concentric radiation shields
5. Composite insulation/heat storage shields.
The latter approach was the only method found acceptable from both a
thermal protection and total mass standpoint. Table h- tabulates the
design characteristics of the fire shield.
The approach taken to protect against the blast fragment environment
has been to place a thin titanium fragment shield at the aft end of the
system to attenuate high energy fragments and provide partial protection
to the flare.
17-
TABLE
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LiH/ZIRCONIA LAUNCH
PAD ABORT FIRE SHIELD (2600°K FIRE, 10 MINUTES)
LiH thickness
Stainless steel structure thickness
Zirconia thickness
Shield length
LiH density
Stainless steel density
Zirconia density
LiH mass
Stainless steel mass
Zirconia mass
Total shield mass
1.9 cm (0.75 in.)
0.152 cm (0.06 in.)
0.31 cm (0.12 in.)
llt-2 cm ( 36l in.)
0.75 gm/cc
.8.0 gm/cc
0.9 gm/cc
32.6kg
28.k kg
6.5 kg
67.5 kg
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The fire shield and outer structure are designed to withstand
the maximum predicted overpressure of 150 psi from an explosion on
the launch pad. Lower pressures will be experienced during a high
altitude abort.
5.3 REENTRY AND AEROTHERMODYNAMICS
Reentry of the radioisotope thermionic power system (RTPS) occurs
only in the event of failure of the launch vehicle to place the payload
in an escape trajectory. All possible abort conditions were considered.
The most likely abort cases cause the RTPS to reenter as a free body.
The most severe reentry cases are: (l) steep reentry (-90 flight
path angle) at escape velocity which resulted in the highest heating
rates and external surface temperatures, and (2) orbital decay reentry
with its attendant long heating pulse which resulted in the highest
internal structural temperatures.
An aerodynamically oriented reentry configuration was adopted to
cause the vehicle to impact on the energy absorbing nose. An oriented
configuration also minimizes reentry protection requirements since the
most severe heating is generally localized over the small nose region.
Oriented reentry was provided by a flare located just aft of the
active radiator area. In addition to providing aerodynamic stability,
the flare also reduces the ballistic coefficient and, thus, reduces
reentry heating. The flare was sized to provide the maximum drag for
the minimum weight.
The worst aerodynamic heating occurs during the -90 reentry on the
flare due to turbulent flow conditions and results in a maximum heat flux
o
of 2500 B/ft sec. The worst total heating occurs during orbital decay
reentry at the stagnation point and results in a total heat load of
6200 B/ft . The worst ablation occurs during reentry at -10 at escape
velocity due to the relatively long heat pulse and high surface temperatures.
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A carbon/graphite fibrous composite, Pyro-Carb ho6, was selected for
the ablative heat shield. A layer of zirconia felt backs up the Pyro-
Carb Uo6 and insulates the underlying structure on the nose and flare,
and structure-safety system on the cylindrical body.
5.1* IMPACT ON WATER
The most likely abort impact mode is immersion in sea water.
Provisions have been incorporated in the .design of the RTFS for water
flotation and recovery. Additional protection is provided by the tungsten
alloy capsules which have excellent sea water corrosion resistance with
less than 0.3 mils per year surface recession rate expected.
5.5 LAND IMPACT
The safety package is designed to survive terminal velocity impact
onto a hard unyielding surface by a combination of energy absorption
honeycomb and structural support of the heat source within the safety
package. Various energy absorption and aerodynamic drag augmentation
systems were considered. The aerodynamic flare selected was designed
to reduce the terminal velocity to V? m/sec. Crushing of the aluminum
honeycomb energy absorber limits the deceleration on impact to 200 gs.
5.6 LOCATION AND RECOVERY AIDS
Recovery aids are incorporated in the safety package for locating
the RTFS following an accidental abort impact onto land or water. In
addition to trajectory and tracking data on the spacecraft, a number of
techniques and devices will be employed to aid in rapid location of the
power supply. These include: (l) radio beacons such as the SARAH system
(Search and Rescue and Homing), (2) radar chaff and reflective coatings
on the flare base and blast shield, (3) sound fixing and ranging (SOFAR)
devices, (k} sea water dye markers, (5) flashing lights, (6) underwater
pingers, and (7) flotation devices.
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8. CONCLUDING SECTION
This study showed the feasibility of a passive containment system
2kk
for the Cm isotope. The passive containment system has inherent
reliability and safety advantages over the original_design (Ref. l),
in which mechanical systems were required to operate in certain launch
abort conditions. In the present design, the launch escape rocket
system is replaced by a blast shield and a fire shield. The blast
shield protects against a booster explosion on the launch pad or during
ascent to earth escape. The fire shield, which consists of refractory
thermal insulation (zirconia felt) and a heat storage material (lithium
hydride), protects the isotopic fuel and its containment vessel from a
sustained propellant fire on the launch pad. The aerodynamic flare,
which stabilizes the orientation during reentry from an abort trajectory,
was enlarged to reduce the ballistic coefficient and the terminal velocity.
At the lower velocity, the impact energy is absorbed by a crushable
honeycomb structure in the nose of the reentry body, with no parachutes
required to reduce the velocity.
The design changes, incorporating a passive containment system and
eliminating the need for a launch escape rocket and parachutes, resulted in
an increase in the mass of the safety equipment.. The mass of the safety
equipment, which is discarded once Earth escape has been verified, was
increased by 270 kg to 575 kg. Since the safety equipment is jettisoned
early in the heliocentric portion of the mission, its mass has a relatively
small effect on mission performance. The reduction in payload mass due to
the 270 kg increase in the safety equipment is only about 55 kg for a
typical mission, such as an orbiter of Saturn.
Calculations of the effects of oxygen released from the Cm 0, fuel
showed that oxygen-induced sublimation of the capsule and emitter heat
pipe or oxygen contamination of the lithium working fluid in the heat pipe
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could limit the lifetime of the system. More experimental data on
oxygen release rates and effects of oxygen are required before radio-
isotope power systems of this type can be designed with reasonable .
assurance of meeting a specified lifetime objective. It appears that
lowering the temperature of the isotopic fuel and using oxygen getters
in the heat source will both be effective in reducing oxygen effects
on the heat source.
The next step in the development of the radioisotope thermionic
power supply for electric propulsion applications should be to establish
the materials and fabrication technology for the isotope capsule and
emitter heat pipe. Capsule vents must be developed to release helium
but minimize the loss of fuel ajid resist plugging by condensed fuel
vapors. The bulk of this development can be performed using a non-
radioactive fuel simulant. A few confirmatory tests should be performed
with Cm 0 -fueled capsules. Fabrication methods for emitter heat pipes
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should be developed and heat pipes tested over a range in temperature,
heat flux, and oxygen pressure so that the results can be extrapolated to
the long lifetimes required for electric propulsion missions.
In addition to establishing the feasibility of a 36, 000- hour
lifetime, the technology development efforts will determine the maximum
thermionic emitter temperature and, hence, the maximum performance level
for the power system. Coupled with the technology development effort
to establish performance levels should be a more thorough and detailed
planning effort for the total development program through the first
flight. A detailed program plan will permit a more accurate estimate
to be made of the development schedule and cost of the system. The
decision whether to develop the system would then be made on the basis
of more accurate mission performance, schedule, and cost data.
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